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Abstract
Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC), recently proposed by Noh, is featured
with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantage, such
as its immunity to the well known PNS attack. In this paper, the theoretical security
of CQC protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding
the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin’s proposal[Phys. Rev.
A 82, 042335 (2010)]. It is also showed that practical CQC implementations may be
vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key
rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector
efficiency.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3], which is the most prominent application
in quantum information theory, enables two distant parties, conventionally referring to
Alice and Bob, to establish a secret key guaranteed by fundamental quantum mechan-
ics, such as the no-cloning theorem. Since the first QKD scheme was proposed in 1984
[1], a lot of attention to QKD has been payed both in theoretical and experimental
areas in these decades[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In Most of the schemes, the information
bits are conventionally encoded into the quantum states, e.g. chosen from two conju-
gated bases, and then transmitted to Bob in the public channel controlled by a powerful
eavesdropper Eve. Recently Noh proposed a novel QKD protocol(Noh09 protocol)
[11] using a striking phenomenon commonly termed as quantum counterfactual effect,
which is initiated by the idea of interaction-free measurement in quantum computation
[12, 13]. It is exciting that the information particles in his protocol are not transmitted
via any physical channel, thus, the security is witnessed straightforwardly.
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In Noh09 protocol, Alice prepares a single photon pulse from two orthogonal states,
i.e., a horizontally polarized state |H > and a vertically polarized state |V >. The
pulse is then split into two by a beam splitter. The initial quantum states after the
BS is written by |φ0(1) >=
√
T |0 >a |H(V) >b +i
√
R|H(V) >a |0 >b, where |0 >a(b)
denotes the vacuum state in mode a(b). In Bob’s secure zone, a polarization beam
splitter (PBS) and optical switch (SW) are applied to block path b according to Bob’s
randomly chosen polarization. Specifically, the sub-pulse in path b is blocked only if
their polarizations are identical, otherwise it will be reflected back to Alice. Ideally,
there are three intrinsic events: (E1) Detector D1 clicks, it occurs when the single
photon is reflected by the BS and their polarizations are identical; (E2) Detector D2
clicks, it occurs when Bob’s polarization is inconsistent with Alice’s, or when Bob’s
polarization is identical to Alice’s and the photon travels in path a; (E3) Detector D3
clicks, it occurs when Bob’s polarization is identical to Alice’s and the photon travels
in path b. The raw key is generated from part of the instances in event E1. Although
a simple security analysis against a special intercept-resent attack was presented in
Noh09 protocol, a more strict one is expected.
Recently, Zhen-qiang Yin [14] et al. gave a security proof of the counterfactual
quantum cryptography with the same technique proposed in ref.[15]. In Yin’s proposal,
the security of Noh09 protocol relies on a so-called equivalent EDP (entanglement dis-
tillation protocol), which is designed to simulate the function of a CQC protocol. Let us
make a simple review on this EDP. Alice first prepared N pairs of entanglement states
written by |Ψ >A= 1√2 [|H > (
√
T |0 >a |H >b +i
√
R|H >a |0 >b) + |V > (
√
T |0 >a
|V >b +i
√
R|V >a |0 >b)], she reserved half of the particles of the entanglement states
in her own and transmitted the other half to Bob, after the photons pass through the
BS. Bob’s blocking operation in Noh09 protocol is abstracted by a unitary operation
which is performed on the pulse in path b. Another unitary is performed on the en-
tanglement state to check the consistency, the sifted key is generated on the subset of
the entanglement states for which the consistency holds. Then its security under the
collective attacks was proved in the rest of the paper, by bounding the phase error rate
of the quantum states.
We find that there are some flaws in Yin’s proposal with two aspects. First, Eve
may not try to entangle her ancilla with the intercepted states, since she has no ac-
cess into mode a, thus she is still unable to get any information about the key even if
she succeeds in doing this. Note that it is not necessary to entangle her ancilla with
the intercepted one for the sake of getting more information. Second,the so-called
equivalence between their EDP and the original protocol needs further consideration,
ambiguous evidence shows that the outputs from the two protocols differ sometimes.
In other words, it is expected to give a equivalence proof from the views of Alice, Bob
and Eve.
In this paper, we give a more intuitive security proof of CQC against the general
intercept-resend attacks. The paper is organized as follow: In section 2, the general
intercept-resend attack is introduced, then an attack model is given. Based on this
model, the key rate for the ideal protocol is calculated in section 3. In section 4, we in-
vestigate the practical security of a real-world CQC implementation in a scenario where
a time-shift attack based on imperfect detectors is performed. At last, a conclusion is
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drawn.
2. Modeling the Attacks
In a conventional QKD scheme, Eve usually performs a unitary operation on the
intecepted qubits and her ancilla, she will not measure her probes until all the classical
information is revealed . Thus Eve’s attack can be formalized by a unitary operator and
an optimal measurement operator conditioned on the classical information. However,
this strategy may not account for a CQC protocol, because information carriers are
never transmitted via the channel, Eve will always fail to entangle her probe with the
right qubits. A more intuitive way is to launch a general intercept-resend attack, with
which Eve may skillfully misleed both Alice and Bob as possible as she can to agree
with a key on those particles travelling in path b, and corrupt as much as possible the
instances in event E1.
Quantum system is an abstract Hilbert space which includes both actual and fictive
subsystems. We denote the initial quantum state in this abstract space by HA ⊗ HB ⊗
HE ⊗ HD, where HA, HB and HE are the subspaces owned by Alice, Bob and Eve
respectively, and HD is a fictive system which describes the measurement results of
detectors D1, D2 and D3. Then the initial state can be expressed by
|Φ0 >= {|Ξxyz > (i
√
R|p >a |0 >b +√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B |e >E}⊗n. (1)
Here |Ξxyz > is a fictive state where x,y and z denote the measurement results of detector
D1, D2 and D3 respectively, p and q are variables set in H or V , and the variable e
denoting Eve’s result of measurement takes the value from {0, H,V}. Let n = 1, for
simplicity, so that only one-bit key is analyzed, hence EQ.(1) is changed to
|Φ0 >= |Ξxyz > (i
√
R|p >a |0 >b +√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B |e >E . (2)
Before Eve’s attack is modeled, it is necessary to define a unitary operator describ-
ing the behaviors of the original protocol,
|Φ 1 >
= UCQC |Ξxyz > (i
√
R|p >a |0 >b +
√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B |e >E
=
1
2 {
∑
{p,q|q=p} i
√
R|p >a |0 >b |q >B (
√
T |Ξp00 > +
√
R|Ξ0p0 >)
+
∑
{p,q|q=p}
√
T |0 >a |p >b |q >B |Ξ00p >
+
∑
{p,q|q,p}(i
√
R|p >a |0 >b
+
√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B |Ξ0p0 >} ⊗ |e >E .
(3)
Eve’s attack is now written by another unitary operator UE acting on the Hilbert space
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HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE ⊗ HD,
|Φ out >
= UE |Φ1 >
=
1
2
∑
{p,q|q=p} i
√
RT |p >a |0 >b |q >B (∑{x,y,z|x=p,y∪z,0} α1xyz|Ξxyz >
|0 >E +α1p00|Ξp00 > |0 >E)
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q=p}(−R)|p >a |0 >b |q >B (
∑
{x,y,z|y=p,x∪z,0} α2xyz|Ξxyz >
|0 >E +α20p0|Ξ0p0 > |0 >E)
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q,p}(i
√
R|p >a |0 >b (∑{x,y,z|x∪y,0,z,0} α3xyz|Ξxyz > |0 >E
+α3p00|Ξp00 > |0 >E +α30p0|Ξ0p0 > |0 >E)
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q=p}
√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B (α4p00|Ξp00 > |p >E
+α40p0|Ξ0p0 > |p >E +α400p|Ξ00p > |p >E)
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q,p}
√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B (α5p00|Ξp00 > |p >E
+α50p0|Ξ0p0 > |p >E +α500q|Ξ00q > |p >E).
(4)
This model is naturally obtained according to the general intercept-resend strat-
egy, and five cases need to be focused on: (C1) Alice’s polarization is consistent with
Bob’s , Mode b is in vacuum and detector D1 is supposed to click. In this case, Eve’s
attack renders at least two detectors click at the same time, this explains the term
∑
{x,y,z|x=p,y∪z,0} α1xyz|Ξxyz > |0 >E , the other term α1p00|Ξp00 > |0 >E represents the
probability of those uncorrupted events. In particular, |0 >E denotes the state when Eve
gets nothing about the key. (C2) Alice’s polarization is consistent with Bob’s, mode
b is in vacuum and detector D2 is supposed to click. Eve’s attack is then presented
in the term
∑
{x,y,z|y=p,x∪z,0} α
2
xyz|Ξxyz > |0 >E . (C3) Alice’s polarization is inconsis-
tent with Bob’s, mode b is in vacuum and detector D2 is supposed to click. similarly,∑
{x,y,z|x∪y,0,z,0} α
3
xyz|Ξxyz > |0 >E describes the events in which at least two detectors
click simultaneously, α3p00|Ξp00 > |0 >E or α30p0|Ξ0p0 > |0 >E tells that detector D1 or
D2 clicks. (C4) Alice’s polarization is consistent with Bob’s, mode b is non-vacuum
and detector D3 is supposed to click. In this case, it is possible for Eve to compromise
the key, as the term α4p00|Ξp00 > |p >E says, the explanation to α400p|Ξ00p > |p >E is that
Eve needs to probe Bob’s polarization sometimes to adjust her following interceptions.
(C5) Alice’s polarization is inconsistent with Bob’s, mode b is non-vacuum and detec-
tor D2 is supposed to click. It is similar with the case C4 except that Eve is unable to
get any information from her results in this case.
We must point out that this formalization is general, or is valid for any intercept-
resend attack in other words, because the coefficients {αixyz|i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} are arbitrary.
In the next section, we will bound Eve’s information based on this model, and give a
more rigorous key rate of CQC under the condition that all the quantum apparatuses
are perfect.
3. Theoretical security against general intercept-resend attacks
In a security proof of conventional quantum key distribution schemes, such as BB84
protocol, security definition is important and an asymptotic security is ultimately con-
cluded as a function of the length of the quantum sequence. In this paper, the infinite-
length security rather than an asymptotic one is investigated.
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Suppose all the quantum apparatuses are perfect, especially the detectors, of which
the efficiency η reaches 1 and the dark counter rate pd is set to zero, any event in which
more than one detectors click is definitely absent, because it implies the existence of
an eavesdropper Eve. Thereby the model is simplified after fixing the terms as {α1xyz =
0|x = p, y ∪ z , 0}, {α2xyz = 0|y = p, x ∪ z , 0} and {α3xyz|z ∪ y , 0, z , 0}. Then one
obtains
|Φ out >
= UE |Φ1 >
=
1
2
∑
{p,q|q=p} i
√
RT |p >a |0 >b |q >B α1p00|Ξp00 > |0 >E
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q=p}(−R)|p >a |0 >b |q >B α20p0|Ξ0p0 > |0 >E
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q,p}(i
√
R|p >a |0 >b (α3p00|Ξp00 > |0 >E
+α30p0|Ξ0p0 > |0 >E)
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q=p}
√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B (α4p00|Ξp00 > |p >E
+α40p0|Ξ0p0 > |p >E +α400p|Ξ00p > |p >E)
+
1
2
∑
{p,q|q,p}
√
T |0 >a |p >b)|q >B (α5p00|Ξp00 > |p >E
+α50p0|Ξ0p0 > |p >E +α500q|Ξ00q > |p >E).
(5)
This model is correct, for instance in the ideal case where there is no eavesdropper one
may obtain
pD1 = RT2 , (6)
pD2 =
R2
2 +
1
2 , (7)
pD3 =
T
2 , (8)
p1e = p2e = p3e = 0. (9)
Note that any pair of inconsistent measurement results of Alice and Bob indicates
an error bit, it is easy to confirm six important parameters which are crucial to bound
Eve’s information IAE ,
pD1 =
RT
2 |a1p00|2 + R2 |a3p00|2 + T2 |a4p00|2 + T2 |a5p00|2, (10)
pD2 =
R2
2 |a20p0|2 + R2 |a30p0|2 + T2 |a40p0|2 + T2 |a50p0|2, (11)
pD3 =
T
2 (|a400p|2 + a500q|2), (12)
p1e = R2 |a3p00|2 + T2 |a5p00|2, (13)
p2e = 0, (14)
p3e =
T
2
|a500q|2. (15)
Now the key rate, as well as the bound of Eve’s information, can be given by the
following theorem,
Theorem 1 For a given observable probability distribution {PD1 , PD2 , PD3 } and
the error rates P1e ,P2e and P3e , the mutual information between Alice and Bob is IAB =
p∗D1 [1 − h(
p1e
pD1
)], and between Alice and Eve is IAE = ( T2 + p3e − pD3 )R, hence the
infinite-effect key rate is
5
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Figure 1: Theoretical key rate of CQC as a function of PD1
mk = IAB − IAE = pD1 − (
T
2
+ p3e − pD3 )R − p∗D1 h(
p1e
pD1
). (16)
Proof: See Appendix A.
So far we have proved the security of CQC against the general intercept-resend
attacks in the context that quantum apparatus works according to its specification. As
we can see in Eq. (16), the key rate is inherently bounded by the probabilities of events
E1, E2 and E3, and the error rates in event E1 and E3 ( Eve’s attack does not affect
event E2, seeing from Eq.(14)). This coincides with the real situation in the sense that
any abnormal probability distribution or a relatively high error rate in one of events
immediately implies the existence of an eavesdropper. Also note that any protocol is
secure only if it satisfies mk > 0. Fortunately, as shown in Fig.1, a positive security key
rate can be achieved when the error rates in event E1 and E3 are small enough and the
probability distribution is not far from normal, i.e., pD1 = RT/2, pD2 = R2/2+ 1/2 and
PD3 = T/2.
4. A time-shift attack in practical CQC system
We have been reminded that imperfect detectors can be the loophole in practical
QKD systems [16], several elaborately conceived attacks can be applied to crack the
whole system without the detection [17, 18, 19]. Unfortunately, such problem also
exists in practical CQC implementations. In this section, it will be showed that practical
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CQC systems are vulnerable to device imperfections by an example of a time-shift
attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
Due to the dark counter rate, two or three detectors might click simultaneously, this
event is denoted by E4. Assume that Eve is as powerful as only constrained by quantum
physics. Naturally, she must lower the probability PE4 to make herself undetectable,
thus it should satisfy
PE4 6 2Pd, (17)
i.e.,
pD4 = RT2
∑
{x,y,z|x=p,y∪z,0} α
1
xyz +
R2
2
∑
{x,y,z|y=p,x∪z,0} a
2
xyz
+
R
2
∑
{x,y,z|x∪y,0,z,0} a3xyz 6 2Pd.
(18)
Event E4 is advantageous to Eve, yet as being bounded by dark counter rate, the cor-
rupted information seems trivial, otherwise Eve takes high risk being detected. Lemma
1.1 gives the maximal corrupted information by Eve.
Lemma 1.1 For a given dark counter rate pd of the detector, the maximal corrupted bit
rate is obtained by
rcmax = (T + 1)Pd + [pD1 − (T + 1)Pd]h(
p1e
pD1 − (T + 1)Pd
) − pD1 h(
p1e
pD1
). (19)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Another important parameter of the detector is the efficiency η, which brings the
risk: Eve may artificially manipulate her device to lower the efficiency η, in order to
pass the test with a greater probability. To compromise the key, Eve has to probe Bob’s
polarization by sending fake photons, then these photons are unlikely to be caught by
detector D3 if the efficiency of detector D3 is low enough. Therefor Eve is able to
control an imperfect detector simply by using an optical delay, i.e., she may launch a
time-shift attack [18]to artificially lower the efficiency to an acceptable level, due to
the distinguishability between the real efficiency function (refer to Fig.2) and the ideal
one. This evidently causes an increment on the mutual information between Alice and
Eve, demonstrated by Lemma 1.2.
Lemma 1.2 Given a prior fixed detector efficiency η , the increment of the mutual
information between Alice and Eve is
△ IηAE =
1 − η
η
(pD3 − p3e)R. (20)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Combined with Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2£the total of the reduced information
mk is immediately obtained by a sum of the two,
△ mk = γcmax + △IηAE . (21)
So the key rate under a time-shift attack is changed to
m
′
k = mk − △mk. (22)
7
Figure 2: Efficiency of an imperfect detector as a function of time.
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Figure 3: The key rate under a time-shift attack.
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Figure 4: security key rate under time-shift attack as functions of PD1 and PD3 , comparing to the ideal one.
As shown in Fig.3, a negative security key rate can be achieved. Consequently, Eve
can obtain full information about the key even if mk > 0. A 3-D illustration of the key
rate as functions of PD1 and PD3 is showed in Fig.4 for a better understanding of this
conclusion. Since there may be , for most of the QKD protocols, unexpected difficulties
when we try to fill the gap between the ideal model and a realistic implementation to
a negligible level at present, it is expected that more applicable CQC protocols are
required in the future.
5. Conclusion
We have proved the security of counterfactual quantum cryptography against gen-
eral intercept-resend attacks, by modeling it with two unitary operations, which are ab-
stracted from Noh09 protocol and the attack strategy respectively. Note that collective
attacks in conventional QKD protocols do not account for CQC equally, yet intercept-
resend attack seems to be more advantageous to the eavesdropper. Intuitively, Eve may
corrupt the key-to-be events and mislead the key generation. The protocol is proved
to be secure against such attacks in the context that quantum apparatuses are perfect,
then the security key rate is bounded by the probability distribution and the error rates
of three intrinsic events. Our result is complementary to the one in Ref.[14], in which
the error rate in events D3 is not involved in the conclusion. Also note that Eve’s attack
not only alters the probability distribution, but also introduces errors, thus, our proof
coincides with the real situation more smoothly. Being demonstrated by the example of
9
a time-shift attack, it is also showed that practical CQC implementation is vulnerable
to imperfect quantum apparatuses, this opens another problem how to put forward a
secure CQC system in real life.
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Appendix A.
Theorem 1 For a given observable probability distribution {PD1 , PD2 , PD3 } and
the error rates P1e ,P2e and P3e , the mutual information between Alice and Bob is IAB =
p∗D1 [1 − h(
p1e
pD1
)], and between Alice and Eve is IAE = ( T2 + p3e − pD3 )R, hence the
infinite-effect key rate is
mk = IAB − IAE = PD1 [1 − h(
P1e
PD1
)]. (A.1)
Proof. To proof Theorem 1, we start with Eq. (5) and fix an important parameter α4
ρ00 ,
which is given by the unitarity of UE shown below
|α4p00|2 + |α40p0|2 + |α400p| = 1. (A.2)
According to case (C4), which is the only one Eve can be successful in, when the fake
photon transmitted by Eve is received by Alice, the probabilities for the two probabili-
ties are immediately set by the BS,
|α4p00|2/|α40p0|2/ = R/T, (A.3)
combine with Eq. (13), (15), (18) and (20), we obtain
|α4p00|2 = (
T
2
+ P3e − PD3 )R. (A.4)
With the binary shannon entropy function, Eve’s information IAE is therefor bounded
by
IAE = I(p : e|D1 = 1,C4 = 1)
= p(E1 = 1,C4 = 1)[1 − h(p(e¯|p)]
= p(E1 = 1,C4 = 1),
=
T
2 |α|4p00
= ( T2 ) + P3e − PD3 R,
(A.5)
where E1 = 1 denote that detector D1 clicks , C4 = 1 means that Eve confirms that
case C4 is occupied, and h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the binary Shannon en-
tropy function. Obviously, Eve obtains no information when pD3 is normal and there is
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no error in event E3. Thereby it is natural to obtain that IAE = 0 if PD3 = T2 and P
3
e = 0 .
To bound the mutual information between Alice and Bob, i.e., IAB , let us first find
the QBER defined by QBER = p(error)p(arrive) , which is different with the one in conventional
QKD schemes. Since only event E1 is useful for the key generation, the QBER can
be equalized to the error rate for event E1, thus, the actual QBER for CQC protocol is
obtained by
QBERD1=1 = p(error|D1 = 1) =
P1e
PD1
. (A.6)
With the similar technique of bounding Eve’s information in APPENDIX Appendix A,
we can obtain IAB
IABI(q : p|D1 = 1) = pD1 [1 − h(QBERD1=1)], (A.7)
where QBERD1=1 is given by Eq.(A.6).
In particular, we could, from Eq.(A.7), obtain IAB = RT2 given QBERD1=1 = 0. This
is consistent with the result for the ideal case. Now the key rate is naturally obtained
by
mk = IAB − IAE
= PD1 − ( T2 + P3e − PD3 )R − PD1 h(
P1e
P D1
). (A.8)
This concludes the proof.
Appendix B.
Lemma 1.1 For a given dark counter rate pd of the detector, the maximal corrupted
bit rate is obtained by
γcmax = (T + 1)Pd + [PD1 − (T + 1)Pd]
∗h( P1ePD1−(T+1)Pd ) − PD1h(
P1e
PD1
). (B.1)
Proof. Before we start the proof, a discussion about Eq.(4) is presented. It is shown
that Event E4 occurs only when mode b is in vacuum, and Eve cannot distinguish Cases
C1 , C2 and C3, her corruption to the key-to-be events in case C1 absolutely affects the
other two. It is not difficult to find that the effect to the three cases is supposed to be
the same as a result of Eve’s corruption, then we obtain
∑
{x,y,z|x=p,y⋃ z,0} |α1xyz|2 =
∑
{x,y,z|y=p,x⋃ z,0} |α2xyz|2
=
∑
{x,y,z|x⋃ y,0,z,0} |α3xyz|2.
(B.2)
To reach the maximum, the total probability for event E4 is set to be
PE4 = 2Pd. (B.3)
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From Eq.(4),(B.2) and (B.3), the following expression can be confirmed
∑
{x,y,z|x=p,y⋃ z,0} |α1xyz|2 =
∑
{x,y,z|y=p,x⋃ z,0} |α2xyz|2
=
∑
{x,y,z|x⋃ y,0,z,0} |α3xyz|2
=
2
R Pd.
(B.4)
In addition, from theorem 1 the mutual information between Alice and Bob when
the corruption occurs is
IrealAB = P
real
D1 [1 − h(
P1
ereal
PrealD1
)], (B.5)
where PrealD1 denotes the real probability for event E1 and P
1
ereal is the corresponding
error rate. Next, we consider the ideal case, correspondingly, the two parameters are
changed to
PrealD1 = P
ideal
D1 − ( RT2
∑
{x,y,z|x=p,y∪z,0} |α1xyz|2
+
R
2
∑
{x,y,z|x∪y,0,z,0} |α3xyz|2),
(B.6)
P1eideal = P
1
ereal. (B.7)
Explanation to Eq.(B.6) follows: It is assumed the term ∑{x,y,z|x⋃ y,0,z,0} |α3xyz|2 only
affects |α3p00|2 and cares nothing about |α30p0|2, since it is advantageous to Eve. Similarly,
R
2
∑
{x,y,z|x∪y,0,z,0} |α3xyz|2 should not affect |α3p00|2. Now the mutual information for the
ideal case is given by
IidealAB = P
ideal
D1 [1 − h(
P1
ereal
PidealD1
)]. (B.8)
Combined with Eq.(B.4),(B.5),(B.6) and (B.7), the total corruption rate γcmax defined
by γcmax = IidealAB − IrealAB is bounded, i.e., we have
γcmax = IidealAB − IrealAB
= (T + 1)Pd
+[PidealD1 − (T + 1)Pd]h(
P1
eideal
PidealD1 −(T+1)Pd
)
−PD1 h( P
1
eideal
PidealD1
).
(B.9)
Substituting PidealD1 and P
1
eideal with PD1 and P
1
e completes the proof.
Appendix C.
Lemma 1.2 Given a prior fixed detector efficiency η , the increment of the mutual
information between Alice and Eve is
△ IηAE =
1 − η
η
(PD3 − P3e)R. (C.1)
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Proof. Note that Eve performs a time-shift attack to control the timing of the detector
indirectly. In this case, the efficiecny is lowered, thereby the probability for event E3 is
reduced to
prealD3 = ηp
ideal
D3 . (C.2)
P3
ereal and P
3
eideal are defined to denote the probability for the real case and the ideal
case respectively. Similarly, the error rate for event E3 is
p3ereal = ηp
3
eideal. (C.3)
From Theorem 1, one immediately obtains
IidealAE = (
T
2
+ P3eideal − PidealD3 )R. (C.4)
Similarly, Eve’s information in a real case is given by
IrealAE = (
T
2 + P
3
ereal − PrealD3 )R. (C.5)
Now combined with Eq.(C.2), (C.3) and (C.4), the increment of the total information
of Eve defined by △IηAE = IrealAE − IidealAE is
△ IηAE =
1 − η
η
(PrealD3 − P3ereal)R. (C.6)
Substituting the labels PrealD3 and P
3
ereal with PD3 and P
3
e completes the proof.
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